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Post-Employment Failure to Warn: A
Viable Means of Circumventing the
Exclusive Remedy Rule?
During the Industrial Revolution, the size and complexity of the
manufacturing process expanded dramatically. A side effect of the
newly industrialized society was the emergence of the industrial injury.
The legal system was called upon to resolve an increasing number
of tort claims between employers and employees for work-related in-
juries.' In many cases, common law doctrines such as contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule pre-
cluded recovery by the injured employee.2 Nevertheless, employers were
faced with growing expenditures for legal fees as well as potential
costs of large employee recoveries. In addition, the legal system was
burdened by an increase in work-related litigation.
Legislatures in all states reacted to the problems of work-related
litigation by enacting workers' compensation statutes.3 The workers'
compensation system balances the interests of both employer and
employee by insulating the employer from liability at law, while pro-
viding the employee with swift and certain compensation for injuries
arising from employment.4 In addition, judicial efficiency is furthered
by a reduction in employment related litigation.
Workers' compensation legislation also effected improved safety in
the workplace. Compensation for work-related injuries is assured by
a statutory requirement that employers purchase compensation in-
I. I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §5.20 at 37-39 (1985).
2. Professor Larson estimates that over 83 percent of work-related injuries were uncompen-
sated at common law. Id. §4.30 at 27. The doctrine of contributory negligence provides that
one who has contributed to his own injury is totally precluded from recovery for the tortious
conduct of another. Id. Assumption of the risk is a tort defense which disallows recovery for
injuries that result from risks that the plaintiff assumed either expressly or impliedly. The in-
dustrial employee was regarded by the courts as having assumed all foreseeable risks of the
employment. Id. at 26-27. The fellow servant rule in essence insulated an employer from liability
for employee injuries which resulted solely from the negligence of another employee. Id. at 25-26.
3. Id. §5.30 at 39. Every state had enacted a workers' compensation statute by 1949.
Id. All workers' compensation statutes are similar in most essential respects. Id. §1.10 at 1-2.
These statutes were originally known as "workmen's" compensation laws, but the headings
were changed in recognition of the changing role of women in labor, as well as a general
attempt to eliminate sexism in statutory language. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §3200.
4. Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 474,
612 P.2d 948, 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863" (1980).
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surance.5 The insurance premiums a company pays to support workers'
compensation are tied, in part, to the company's overall safety record.6
The increasing risks of modern employment, however, have outpaced
the ability of workers' compensation law to achieve workplace safety.
For example, exposure in employment to chemical or nuclear
substances may cause injury that is not fully realized for many years
after the exposure.' The possibility that an employer may become liable
for workers' compensation payments in the distant future provides
little present incentive to keep the workplace safe from exposure to
harmful substances.
Congress and state legislatures have addressed workplace safety
through enactment of Occupational Safety and Health Acts (OSHA).
While OSHA-type schemes attempt to maintain and enforce basic levels
of safety in the workplace,' the acts do not provide an employee with
a direct remedy for employer violation of the statute.' An employee's
statutory remedy is restricted to workers' compensation benefits even
though the injury does not become apparent until long after the
employment relationship terminates.' 0 With increasing success,
employees have sought tort remedies against employers in addition
to ordinary workers' compensation benefits." The judiciary has
developed several theories to provide employees with legal means to
circumvent the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation laws.'"
5. CAL. LAD. CODE §3700. The consequences of employer failure to insure are severe,
First, the employee is entitled to bring a tort action against the employer. Id. §3706. In a
tort action brought under section 3706, the employer must rebut a statutory presumption of
negligence. Id. §3708. Finally, the common law defenses of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of the risk, and the fellow servant rule are not available to the employer. Id.
6. CAL. INS. CODE §11821(c).
7. See generally, Comment, Monitoring Employees for Genetic Alterations: Is State Regula-
tion Essential?, 15 PAC. L.J. 349 (1984).
8. See 29 U.S.C. §§651-673 (Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act); CAL. LAB.
CODE §§6300-7915 (California Occupational Safety and Health Act). The federal act is inap.
plicable if a state adopts an approved OSHA statute. 29 U.S.C. §667(b).
9. CAL. LAB. CODE §6307 (enforcement of the California Occupational Safety and Health
Act is entrusted solely to the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Occupational
Safety and Health); but cf. id. §6304.5 (evidence of an employer violation of the California
Occupational Safety and Health Act is admissible in an action for personal injury or wrongful
death between employee and employer).
10. Id. §3601 (exclusive remedy rule).
11. See, e.g., Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (develop.
ing so-called "fraudulent concealment exception" to the exclusive remedy rule). The judiciary,
however, is exhibiting resistance to this trend. See United States Borax and Chemical Corp.
v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 406, 411, 213 Cal. Rptr. 155, 159 (1985). "[The plaintiff's
bar's] continual efforts to make end-runs around the exclusivity provisions of the workers'
compensation system would be more appropriately addressed to the Legislature . . . ." Id.
12. An early judicial exception was the dual capacity doctrine. In essence, dual capacity
means that if an employer negligently injures an employee while acting in a capacity other
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Since workers' compensation benefits are hardly adequate to com-
pensate an injured employee who has developed cancer or genetic
damage 3 as a result of exposure to harmful substances during employ-
ment, an employee may attempt a tort action to supplement the
workers' compensation recovery. No California court has considered
a case in which exposure to harmful substances during employment
has resulted in injury manifested subsequent to the termination of
employment. A federal court,"' however, has recently applied California
law' 5 to an analogous fact pattern. 16 The holding of the court may
allow circumvention of workers' compensation exclusivity provisions
if adopted by California.
In Molsbergen v. United States,'I the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted California law to hold an employer liable in tort for fail-
ing to warn a former employee of the dangers of exposure to nuclear
radiation, when the danger was discovered after the termination of
the employment relationship. 8 The tort of post-employment failure
to warn will probably be tested in the near future by employees seek-
ing a lucrative tort recovery instead of workers' compensation benefits.
The purpose of this comment is to determine the viability of the
post-discharge failure to warn theory under California law. After sum-
marizing the development of the theory in the federal context,"' this
than as employer, the employee may sue the employer in tort. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d
781, 793, 249 P.2d 8, 15 (1952). The fraudulent concealment exception arises when the employee's
injuries are aggravated by the employer's wrongful concealment of the existence of the injury
and its connection with the employment. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d at 956,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. But cf. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602. The legislature has constricted judicial
exceptions. Id. The dual capacity exception has been eliminated in all but the products
liability context. Id. §3602(b)(3). The fraudulent concealment exception has been codified, and
thus limited to the statutory language. Id. §3602(b)(2).
13. Cf. Comment, supra note 7 (recommending that the state monitor employees exposed
to dangerous substances for genetic alterations).
14. Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 106 S.
Ct. 30 (1985).
15. Id. at 1020. Since there is no California law on point, a federal court is required
to make a reasonable determination of what the California Supreme Court would decide if
faced with the case. Id.
16. The suit in Molsbergen was brought by the widow of a veteran who died from cancer.
Id. at 1017. The issue was whether California law would support a tort action against the
government for post-discharge failure to warn of the harmful consequences that could result
from exposure to nuclear radiation during military service. Id. at 1018.
17. Id. at 1016.
18. Id. at 1024. The court specifically limited the holding to exposure to nuclear radiation.
Id. at 1024. The theory behind the holding, however, is not fact-bound. The post-discharge
failure to warn theory has been applied in federal cases involving exposure to substances rang-
ing from L.S.D. to Agent Orange. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text. The require-
ment that the danger be discovered after the termination of employment was set forth in an
earlier case. Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 1983) (Broudy 11); see also
Broudy v. United States, 661 F.2d 125, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1981) (Broudy 1). See infra text ac-
companying notes 62-70 (discussing the Broudy holdings).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 30-68.
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comment will scrutinize the Molsbergen analysis of California law
relating to post-discharge failure to warn. 2 The post-discharge failure
to warn theory will then be related to the employment context.2
Finally, this comment will argue that the post-discharge failure to warn
theory is not viable in the employment context due to many practical
shortcomings, as well as to conflicts with existing California law and
policy.2 2 The solution to the problems arising from exposure to harmful
substances during employment requires legislative, rather than judicial,
action.23
DEVELOPMENT OF POST-DIscHARGE FAILURE To
WARN THEORY IN FEDERAL LAW
In Feres v. United States,2 the United States Supreme Court
announced a doctrine which immunizes the federal government from
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)25 to military per-
sonnel who have been injured incident to service. 26 The Feres doc-
trine is analogous to workers' compensation law in that the exclusive
remedy for veterans injured during active duty is the Veteran's Benefits
Act. 27 The post-discharge failure to warn theory has been utilized in
federal case law as a means of circumventing the Feres doctrine. A
discussion of the evolution of the post-discharge failure to warn theory
will demonstrate how future application of the theory by California
state courts may circumvent the exclusivity provisions 28 of California
workers' compensation law.29
20. See infra text accompanying notes 69-94.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 95-156.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 157-93.
23. See Heilman v. United States, 731 F.2d 1104, 1113 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Adams, J.
concurring).
24. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
25. 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680.
26. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
27. 38 U.S.C. §§1-5228. The veteran's benefits act is the exclusive remedy since the in-
jured soldier is precluded from bringing an action under the FTCA by Feres. Feres, 340 U.S.
at 146.
28. CAL. LAB. CODE §§3601, 3602.
29. As this topic is discussed only as background for the main focus of the comment,
coverage herein will be necessarily brief. Many other articles and law review commentaries have
covered the subject in more depth. See, e.g., DeDominicis, Atomic Vets Take Their Case to
Court, CAL. LAWYER, June 1982, at 29 [hereinafter cited as DeDominicis, Atomic Vets];
Comment, Postdischarge Failure to Warn: Judicial Response to Veterans' Attempts to Circum-
vent the Feres Doctrine, 30 ViLL. L. Rav. 263 (1985) (surveying the more recent cases); Com-
ment, Solving the Feres Puzzle: A Proposed Analytical Framework for "Incident to Service, "
15 PAC. L.J. 1181 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Solving the Feres Puzzle] (focus on
the meaning of the enigmatic term "incident to service"); Comment, Judicial Recovery for
the Post-Service Tort: A Veteran's Last Battle, 14 PAC. L.J. 333 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
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A. Factual Background
From the late 1940s to the early' 1960s, the United States military
exposed thousands of service personnel to harmful substances such
as nuclear radiation, 30 L.S.D., 3' mustard gas, 32 and Agent Orange. 33
Awareness of the effects of the health hazards posed by these
substances is emerging slowly, years after the mass exposures.3 4
Although Congress has authorized a comprehensive system of veteran's
benefits, 35 as a practical matter, most veterans have not been com-
pensated through the statutory mechanism due to an inability to
establish a causal relationship between the exposure to the substance
and the disease. 36 Consequently, many veterans are seeking compen-
sation under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 37
B. The Feres Doctrine
At common law, the federal government enjoyed the benefit of
sovereign immunity from suit. 31 Subject to certain exceptions, 39 Con-
gress waived this immunity by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act
Comment, Post-Service Tort] (survey of post-discharge tort theory); Comment, Duty to Warn
as an Inroad to the Feres Doctrine: A Theory of Tort Recovery for the Veteran, 43 OHio
ST. L.J. 267 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Duty to Warn]; Comment, Radia-
tion Injury and the Atomic Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32
HASTINGs L.J. 933 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Shifting the Burden] (proposing that
the government bear the burden of negating causation); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should
Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1099 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Post-Service Tort] (survey of post-discharge tort theory); Comment, Duty
its abolition).
30. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d 1016.
31. Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979).
32. Schnurmann v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429 (E.D.Va. 1980).
33. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
34. Comment, Post-Service Tort, supra note 29, at 334. The consequences of exposure
to these substances include cancer, sterility, and birth defects. Id.
35. 38 U.S.C. §§1-5228 (Veterans' Benefits Act).
36. See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussion of problems in proving causa-
tion). As of August, 1982, veterans had recovered benefits under the VBA in only 16 of 700
cases. DeDominicis, Atomic Vets, supra note 29, at 31. However, recent legislation has allowed
veterans who were exposed to nuclear radiation or Agent Orange to receive Veteran's Administra-
tion Hospital benefits without a showing of causation. 38 U.S.C. §610(e).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§2671-2680.
38. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139.
39. 28 U.S.C. §2680. Section 2680 excepts tort claims arising from the negligence of govern-
ment officials who are performing discretionary functions. Id. §2680(a). In addition, claims
based on an intentional tort of a government official may not be prosecuted against the United
States under the FTCA. Id. §2680(h). Claims arising in foreign countries are also excepted
from coverage under the FTCA. Id. §2680(k). Further, the federal government is not liable
for claims arising during the conduct of military combat. Id. §26800). Finally, there are several
miscellaneous exceptions relating to postal service operations, taxation and other financial matters.
See generally id. §2680 (listing remaining exceptions to the government's FTCA liability).
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(FTCA). Under the FTCA the United States is liable for personal
injuries caused by the negligence of government employees, to the
same extent that a private person would be in similar circumstances
under the law of the place where the tort occurred.40
The FTCA does not specifically except claims of service person-
nel.4' In 1950, however, the United States Supreme Court decided
Feres v. United States.42 Feres established the doctrine that the federal
government cannot be held liable under the FTCA to service person-
nel whose injuries "arise out of or are in the course of activity inci-
dent to service. ' '4 By precluding recovery under the FTCA, the Feres
doctrine in effect sets up the Veteran's Benefits Act as the exclusive
remedy for injuries suffered by service personnel during active duty. 44
Confronted with a judicial bar to recovery under the FTCA, as well
as a practical inability to recover veterans' benefits, many veterans
exposed to harmful substances have been left without a remedy for
their injuries. Thus, veterans have attempted to develop theories to
circumvent the Feres doctrine. At present, the post-discharge tort is
paramount among these legal theories.4
40. 28 U.S.C. §2674; see also 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (stating same rule and conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on the federal district courts over all FTCA claims). See infra text accompanying
notes 77-94 (discussing application of California law to a failure to warn claim).
l1. See 28 U.S.C. §2680. See also Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). "We
are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that of a serviceman."' Id. at 51.
42. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
43. Id. at 146. The Feres doctrine has been the subject of scathing criticism from both
courts and commentators. See, e.g., -Note, From Fetes to Stencel, supra note 29; Monaco v.
United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982). However,
the doctrine was solidly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1977. Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In the 35 years since Feres was decided, Congress
has not abolished the doctrine. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983). Four basic
policies underlying the Feres doctrine have been identified: (a) the fact that there is no truly
analogous private liability; (b) the fact that Congress had already provided no-fault recovery
for veterans through the VBA; (c) inconsistent treatment of military claims which would result
from applying the law of the place where the tort occurred; (d) deleterious effects on military
discipline caused by potential civil liability. Note, From Feres to Stencel, supra note 29, at
1101-02. The foremost policy rationale is a judicial perception that potential civil liability would
exert deleterious effects on military discipline. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672. See also Chappell,
462 U.S. at 304; Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This rationale
has curiously aided courts in applying the doctrine not only to deny recovery to veterans
themselves, but also to the children of veterans who have suffered genetic defects. Monaco,
661 F.2d 129, 134. The discipline rationale has also served as the basis for denying relief to
third party claimants for indemnity. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 674.
44. See Comment, Duty to Warn, supra note 29, at 269. The Veteran's Benefits Act is
not proving helpful to veterans seeking recovery for injuries caused by exposure to harmful
substances. Id. See also Comment, Shifting the Burden, supra note 28, at 957 (statistics show-
ing Veteran's Administrtion rejected 99 percent of claims for disorders alleged to have been
induced by exposure to nuclear radiation). But cf. 38 U.S.C. §610(e) (allowing veterans who
have been exposed to radiation or Agent Orange to receive hospital benefits without proving
causal connection between the symptoms and the exposure).
45. A competing theory of recovery was based on alleged constitutional violations. See,
1482
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C. The Post-Discharge Tort
The lineage of the post-discharge tort can be traced to the 1954
case of United States v. Brown." In Brown, the United States Supreme
Court held the government liable under the FTCA for medical malprac-
tice in aggravating an injury originally incurred by a serviceman during
military service. 47 Seizing on the "incident to service ' 48 requirement
of the Feres doctrine, the Brown court held that a tort that occurred
after discharge was cognizable under the FTCA. 49 Failure to warn
as a post-service tort also emerged in medical malpractice cases.5"
Because the typical cases5' involved post-discharge failures to warn
of ailments caused by service related injuries, the requirement that
the alleged tort be independent from negligence occurring during ser-
vice was easily met.52 In contrast, when governmental negligence that
occurred while the plaintiff was in active service was merely continued
after discharge, recovery was denied."
In the context of exposure to harmful substances, veterans had par-
ticular difficulty in identifying a separate and independent post-
e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1982).
In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has been willing to allow tort recovery directly under
the Constitution. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). This theory, however, has been firmly rejected in the context of service-
related injuries. Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1235-37; see also Chappel, 462 U.S. at 304.
46. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
47. Id. at 113. The plaintiff in Brown sustained a knee injury during active duty. After
discharge, a Veteran's Administration Hospital negligently aggravated the injury during an opera-
tion. Id. at 110-11. See also Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1948) (holding the govern-
ment liable for injuries to a serviceman which occurred during his furlough and were unrelated
to his military service).
48. See Comment, Solving the Feres Puzzle, supra note 29 (detailed discussion of the meaning
of "incident to service").
49. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113. The Court recognized that but for the injury during service,
Brown could not have been injured by the V.A. Hospital. Id. at 112. However, post-service
medical malpractice was sufficiently separate and independent from the original injury to allow
recovery. Id.
50. See, e.g., Hungerford v. United States, 307 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1962) (post-service failure
to warn of brain damage caused by combat injury); Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp.
1016 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (post-service failure to warn of presence of known carcinogen implanted
in sinal passage during service).
51. See, e.g., Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1973); Toal v. United
States, 438 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1971); Shults v. United States; 421 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1969).
52. There are two primary reasons for strict adherence to the requirement that the tort
must occur after the plaintiff's discharge from service. First, tort recovery for an injury that
is wholly separate and independent from military service does not threaten any of the policy
factors underlying the Feres doctrine. See supra note 43. Secondly, the separateness require-
ment ensures that the plaintiff is not recovering for a continuing tort, i.e., that the mere fact
of discharge does not operate to circumvent Feres. Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639
F.2d 1146, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981).
53. Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774, 778 (3rd Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1016 (1972); see also Wisniewski v. United States, 416 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
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discharge tort since the initial exposure occurred during service. Courts
reasoned that the exposure itself was tortious, and although the govern-
ment's failure to warn compounded the injury, the effects merely con-
tinued after discharge." A breakthrough came in Thornwell v. United
States,5" in which the court allowed an FTCA claim for post-discharge
failure to warn in a case involving exposure to L.S.D.
The Thornwell court identified an independent post-service tort
based upon the differing character of the government's conduct before
and after the plaintiff's discharge. 6 The exposure during service was
deemed an intentional tort, while the failure to warn wasrnegligent.
Therefore, the court reasoned that the post-service failure to warn
was an "entirely different tort.""7 While Thornwell has drawn some
following in the federal courts,5" most courts have not followed the
case."
Rejection of Thornwell is based on the recognition that, if the
original conduct of the government was tortious at all, the govern-
ment must have been aware of the risks of exposure. Hence, the duty
to warn arose at the time of the exposure and was immediately breach-
ed.60 The failure to warn, therefore, occurred during service and can-
not support a circumvention of Feres. Post-discharge failure to warn
will thus circumvent the Feres doctrine only when the exposure dur-
ing service was entirely innocent."
54. Stanley, 639 F.2d at 1155.
55. 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C. 1979). In Thorniwell, the military had intentionally exposed
the veteran to L.S.D. during service, and after discharge had failed to warn or rescue the
veteran from the dangers. Id. at 346-47.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318 (S.D. Ohio, 1980).
59. See, e.g. Heilman, 731 F.2d at 1108; Hamilton v. United States, 719 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097, 1101 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2354 (1984); Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1118 (1983); Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210
(1983).
60. The basic premise in Thorniwell that the differing character of the original intentional
conduct and the subsequent negligence justifies treatment of the acts as separate torts is indeed
illogical, but typifies the confusion that post-discharge failure to warn has generated in both
bench and bar. Broudy II, 722 F.2d at 569. The Broudy case arrived at the Ninth Circuit
after remand in Broudy I because "the trial court's inquiry was misguided." Id. In addition,
the Government made "several arguments which reveal[ed] its misunderstanding of the Feres
doctrine and [the] decision in Broudy L" Id.
61. No analytical distinction exists between situations where the original exposure was either
an intentional tort or mere negligence. The mere act of exposing service personnel to substances
not known to be harmful to humans is not tortious. Characterizing the conduct as tortious
in either case means that, at the time of exposure, the military knew or should have known
that the substance was dangerous. The duty to warn arises at the time the defendant knows
or should know that the conduct has placed another in jeopardy. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs, §§321-322 (1965).
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Broudy v. United States62 was the first case to reconcile logically
the failure to warn theory with the limitations of the Feres doctrine.
The Broudy court allowed an FTCA action based upon post-discharge
failure to warn, but success depended upon proof that the govern-
ment learned of the risk of exposure after the plaintiff's discharge
from service. 63 The innocent ignorance of the government as to the
dangers must have continued until after the particular plaintiff was
discharged from service." The failure to warn theory is thus recon-
ciled with Feres as the independence of the alleged post-discharge tort
is guaranteed. Analytically, this version of the failure to warn theory
may prove as effective in circumventing the exclusivity provisions of
California workers' compensation law65 as the theory is in circum-
venting Feres.
While the innocent exposure approach is logically consistent with
the original post-discharge tort cases, 66 this approach also presents
an almost insurmountable obstacle to recovery. Paradoxically, the
government can escape liability by proving that the dangers were known
at the time the service personnel were exposed to the harmful
substances. 67 Assuming the plaintiff can prove that the government
did not learn of the risks of exposure until after discharge from ser-
vice, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that local law would sup-
port a similar claim against a private person. 6 Recently, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether California law would
support a claim for failure to warn.
62. Broudy , 661 F.2d 125; Broudy 1, 722 F.2d 566. The theory developed in the Broudy
cases has recently been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873,
880 (lth Cir. 1985).
63. Broudy , 661 F.2d at 128-29; see also Broudy 1, 722 F.2d at 570.
64. Broudy II, 772 F.2d at 570. This additional step is forced by the requirement that
the tort occur wholly after discharge. Assuming that the government has not warned the plain-
tiff by the time of trial, the initial breach of the duty to warn must have occurred at the
time the duty arose. In order for the breach to have occurred after discharge, the duty to
warn must have arisen after discharge. Therefore, to avoid the constraints of Feres, the plain-
tiff must prove that the government did not learn of the risks of exposure until after the plain-
tiff's discharge from military service. Id. The Broudy I analysis thus neatly avoids the pitfalls
that were exploited by the numerous cases rejecting Thorniwell. See supra notes 58-61 and
accompanying text (cases rejecting Thorniwell). Though this incarnation of the failure to warn
theory is logically sound, it creates many inconsistencies in actual application. See infra text
accompanying notes 66-67 (discussion of paradoxical effects of the theory).
65. See infra notes 157-193 and accompanying text (analysis of the effectiveness of failure
to warn theory in the context of workers' compensation).
66. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
67. In Re Consolidated United States Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 759,
779 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
68. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (conditioning government tort liability on a finding that a private
person, similarly situated, would be liable under the law of the place where the tort occurred).
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D. The Molsbergen Analysis of California Duty to Warn Law
In Molsbergen v. U.S.," the widow of a veteran who died from
cancer brought an action for post-discharge failure to warn. 0
Molsbergen was the first case in which the question of whether local
law would support the post-discharge failure to warn theory was
squarely posed.7' Failure to warn was not tortious at common law.
The mere failure to act for another's benefit was not considered
wrongful, even when the inaction resulted in harm to another., While
the difference between action and inaction is theoretically clear, in
practice the distinction is difficult to draw." Early departures from
the strict view that there was no duty to aid another involved defen-
dants who were common carriers ' or who enjoyed a special relation-
ship with the plaintiff."' Courts also have had little difficulty finding
a duty of affirmative action when the defendant's conduct created
the risk to the plaintiff. 6
69. 757 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985).
70. Id. at 1019.
71. Id. at 1020.
72. See generally, PROSSER AND KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, §56 at 373 (W. Keeton,
5th ed. 1984). The reluctance to penalize nonfeasance was a consequence of a strong judicial
policy that the courts should not become "an agency for forcing men to help one another." Id.
73. Id. at 374. Despite the difficulty in distinguishing between action and inaction, the
distinction lingers on. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36,
123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1973). To illustrate: a doctor's failure to warn a patient of the harmful
effects of treatment is clearly medical malpractice, an affirmative act of negligence. Toal, 438
F.2d at 225. On the other hand, the failure of the government to warn service personnel of
the dangers of exposure to nuclear radiation is less clearly an affirmative act. Heilman, 731
F.2d at 1107. The difficulty in conceptualizing failure to warn as an affirmative act may par-
tially explain the early reluctance of the federal courts to recognize failure to warn as an actionable
tort outside the medical malpractice area. Stanley, 639 F.2d 1146, 1154.
74. A common carrier is a person or entity providing, for example, transportation or com-
munications services. See, e.g., Middleton v. Whitridge, 108 N.E. 192, 197 (1915).
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §314A (1965). Persons typically held to have a special
relationship with the plaintiff sufficient to give rise to an affirmative duty to act are innkeepers.
Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.D. Mo. 1942). Landowners have a similar duty
to act. L. S. Ayers Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E. 2d 334, 337-38 (1942). In addition, the employment
relationship gives rise to a duty to act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §314B (1965). When
the common law imposed a duty to act, the duty applied regardless of whether the defendant's
original conduct was negligent or entirely innocent. Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Co., 20 S.E. 2d 299, 303-4 (1942). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§321-322 (1965).
76. Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E. 2d 841, 843 (1967). When an actor's prior conduct was
innocent, "he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care when, because of a change of cir-
cumstances, or further knowledge of the situation which he has acquired, he realizes or should
realize that he has created such a risk." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §321, comment a
(1965). See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 72, §56 at 377. "Where the original danger
is created by innocent conduct, . . . there is a general recognition of a duty to take action." Id.
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Consistent with a trend setting tradition in tort law,77 California
courts have been liberal in finding duties to warn." California courts
have gone beyond imposing a duty to warn persons endangered by
the defendant's own conduct. Indeed, defendants in certain
cirucumstances are required to warn persons endangered by the con-
duct of third parties."9 No California court has considered a failure
to warn case analogous to the post-discharge tort situation, however,
so the Molsbergen court was required to anticipate California law."
The conclusion of the court that California would impose on the
government a duty to warn service personnel of the health hazards
of exposure to nuclear radiation"' is hardly novel since the original
conduct of the government, even though innocent, was the source
of the risk.82
The Molsbergen court concluded that California would impose a
duty to warn when four factors were present.83 The first factor is
that the defendant must have had knowledge of a risk to another's
77. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (landmark strict products liability case); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market
share apportionment of fault).
78. See Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (psychologist had duty to warn parents of murder victim that patient
had expressed intention of killing the victim); Johnson v. California, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d
352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968) (state had duty to warn foster parents of violent tendencies of
recently paroled foster child).
79. See Weirum, 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (radio station had duty
to control conduct of persons responding to a contest, as the contest created a risk of harm
to plaintiff and was affirmative misfeasance); Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888,
193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1983) (physician had duty to warn patient who injured plaintiff against
driving in an uncontrolled diabetic condition); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 298, 191 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1983) (county sheriff had duty to warn decedent's family
before releasing suicide-prone decedent from custody).
80. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1020. When no state law is on point, a federal court "must
make a reasonable determination . . . as to the result that the highest state court would reach
if it were deciding the case." Id.
81. 757 F.2d at 1020-25. Molsbergen is correct as far as the opinion takes the analysis.
See infra note 154.
82. See Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 (1978). Because a
doctor's action created the risk, Tresemer held that the doctor had a duty to warn the patient
of newly discovered risks associated with the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device (IUD), even
though the physician-patient relationship had not continued. Id. at 672, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
The case is strong precedent for the imposition of a duty to warn under the Molsbergen facts,
and is reminiscent of many of the federal failure to warn cases in the medical malpractice
context. See Toal, 438 F.2d 222.
83. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1024. California courts have held that the basic component
of legal duty is the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d
at 435, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22. "The most important of these considerations
in establishing duty is foreseeability." Id. The factors cited by the Molsbergen court are indicia
of the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1024.
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health or safety.14 Secondly, the court noted that the defendant's con-
duct, though blameless, must have created the risk to the plaintiff.8"
Next, the burden of executing the duty to warn must not have been
onerous. 6 Finally, the defendant must have had reason to believe that
the warning would have some practical effect. 87 The third and fourth
factors are interrelated because if the person subject to the risk is
not readily identifiable, a general warning to the populace at large
will likely be both onerous and ineffective. 8
Because the four factors were easily met under the allegations in
the Molsbergen case,8 9 the court held that the government would have
a duty to warn under California law. 0 Since federal liability under
the FTCA depends upon whether a private person in similar cir-
cumstances would be liable under local law,9' the court drew an
analogy between the government and a private employer. 92 The primary
defect in the Molsbergen analysis arises from the failure of the court
to fully consider the implications of this analogy. Though the liability
of a private employer is clearly governed by workers' compensation
law, 93 the Molsbergen court inexplicably ignored this body of law.94
CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
The viability of the failure to warn theory under California law
necessarily raises the issue of workers' compensation. The compensa-
tion provisions are comprehensive95 and are to be "liberally construed
34. This knowledge must have been acquired after the plaintiff left military service. See
supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
35. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1024. Under the analysis of the Broudy cases, the defen-
dant's conduct in exposing service personnel to harmful substances is, by definition, innocent.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
36. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1024. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342,
131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
37. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1024. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,
754-56, 614 P.2d 728, 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 77-78 (1980).
88. See Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 755, 614 P.2d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
89. Since the case was appealed from a dismissal of the complaint, the court treated all
allegations as true. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1018 n.2.
90. Id. at 1024. The court expressly limited its holding to the facts of the case. Id.
91. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2674.
92. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1020.
93. See CAL. CowsT. art. XIV, §4.
94. The applicability of workers' compensation to the facts of Molsbergen is suggested
in Feres, 340 U.S. at 143. Discussing the inequities that would result from applying state law
to soldiers stationed in different states, the Court noted that "[w]e cannot ignore the fact that
most states have abolished the common law action for damages between employer and employee
and superseded it with workman's [sic] compensation statutes which provide, in most instances,
the sole basis of liability" (emphasis added). Id.
95. CAL. LAB. CODE §3201.
1488
1986 / Post-Employment Failure to Warn
by the courts" in favor of employee recovery. 6 If the initial exposure
to hazardous substances occurred during employment, the question
becomes whether the injuries are covered by the provisions of Califor-
nia workers' compensation law.
A. Workers' Compensation Recovery for Exposure to
Hazardous Substances
Under California law, all injuries arising in the course of employ-
ment are covered by workers' compensation.97 In the context of
exposure to hazardous substances, the employee may encounter a prob-
lem with the statute of limitations, which is one year for most workers'
compensation claims.9 8 Assuming that the employer has failed to warn
the employee of the risks of exposure, the employee may not discover
the injury or the connection between the injury and the employment
within one year of the initial exposure. 99 California courts, however,
have been exceedingly diligent in effectuating the liberal construction
provision.' 0 The "rule of discovery" is applied in workers' compen-
sation cases.'' The rule provides that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the date the employee, or former employee,
learns of the nature of the injury and the relationship of the injury
to the employment. 0 2 This interpretation has statutory support,'0 3 and
is accepted in the case law.' 04
Though the statute of limitations will not limit recovery for injuries
caused by exposure to hazardous substances, workers' compensation
may not adequately compensate the employee for work-related in-
juries. Damages for pain and suffering as well as for punitive damages
are unavailable under workers' compensation law.105 In addition,
workers' compensation benefits are generally limited to medical
expenses and lost earnings. 0 6 Thus, the employee's remedy under the
96. Id. §3202.
97. Id. §3600(a).
98. See id. §§5400-5412.
99. Id. §5405.
100. Id. §3202. See generally Mastoris, The Statutes of Limitation in Workers' Compensa-
tion Proceedings, 15 CAL. W. L. REV. 32 (1979).
101. Mastoris, supra note 100, at 43.
102. Id.
103. See CAL. LAB. CODE §5412 (the date of injury for occupational or cumulative injury
is the date of discovery).
104. See Chambers v. WCAB, 69 Cal. 2d 556, 559-61, 446 P.2d 531, 533-34, 72 Cal. Rptr.
651, 653-54 (1968).
105. Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court: The Not-So-Exclusive
Remedy Rule, 33 HAsTiNGs L.J. 263, 267-70 (1981).
106. See generally CAL. LAB. CODE §§4650-4755 (setting forth remedies). But cf. Renteria
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workers' compensation mechanism may be substantially less than actual
damages.'0 7 An employee injured by hazardous substances has a strong
incentive to seek a remedy outside the workers' compensation system.
In procuring a tort remedy, the employee will have to contend with
the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation law.,0"
B. The Exclusive Remedy Rule of Workers' Compensation
The exclusivity provision substitutes the remedies of the workers'
compensation statute for those the employee might otherwise have
obtained in a tort action against the employer.' 9 Underlying the
exclusivity provision is a policy of preserving a balance between the
interests of employer and employee." 0 The employee is assured
relatively swift compensation on a no-fault basis, while the employer
receives immunity from liability at law."'1
While the policy has remained constant, the equities supporting the
exclusivity provision have changed over time.' 12 When workers' com-
pensation laws were first enacted, employee recovery was virtually
foreclosed by the availability of defenses such as contributory
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule." 3 In
recent decades, however, tort verdicts have become far easier to secure
and the awards more lucrative,' while workers' compensation
payments have remained relatively low. Consequently, workers' com-
pensation laws, which were once an employee's only guarantee of
recovery, now severely limit the recovery the employee might other-
wise receive in a tort action. Employees thus have an increasing in-
centive to attempt to circumvent the exclusivity provision." 5 In this
v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978) (allowing tort claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress because workers' compensation system provided
no remedy for non-physical injury incurred in employment).
107. However, the employee may be able to enhance workers' compensation recovery by
50% if the employer's failure to warn can be characterized as "serious and willful miscon-
duct." CAL. LAB. CODE §4553.
108. All workers' compensation statutes contain exclusivity provisions. 2A A. LARSON, THE
LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §65.00 (1985). See CAL. LAB. CODE §§3600, 3601, 3602
(exclusivity provisions of California workers' compensation law).
109. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602.
110. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
111. Id. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§3600-3602.
112. Comment, supra note 105, at 267-70.
113. See supra note 2.
114. See CAL. LAB. CODE §2801 (abolishing common law defenses of assumption of the
risk and the fellow servant rule, and curtailing contributory negligence in actions between employee
and employer).
115. Understandably, employers are now advocates of payment of workers' benefits. The
current position reflects an ironic shift in attitude. Comment, supra note 105, at 266.
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respect, the position of an injured employee is analogous to that of
former service personnel who are unable to recover adequate benefits
from the Veterans Administration. 1 6 Several statutory or judicial
exceptions to the workers' compensation exclusivity provision have
been recognized over the years." 7
C. Exceptions to Exclusivity
In 1952, the California Supreme Court developed an exception to
the exclusivity provision known as the "dual capacity" doctrine." '
The dual capacity doctrine concerns the situation in which the
employee's injuries are caused by an employer acting in a capacity
other than as an employer." 9 Although the injuries are work-related
to the extent that they are inflicted by the employer, the fact that
the employer is acting in another capacity allows recovery by the
employee in tort. 20 In Duprey, for example, a nurse employed by
a chiropractor was negligently treated by the chiropractor for an in-
jury.' 2' The plaintiff was allowed to sue her employer for malprac-
tice because the employer was acting in the capacity of a doctor rather
than an employer.'22 The dual capacity exception also has been applied
to cases in which the employer manufactures a product that injures
the employee. 23 The application of dual capacity to products liability
cases is attractive, since the employer may also be the manufacturer
of harmful substances to which the employee is exposed.' 24 Dual
116. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
117. See J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LITIGATION AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION, (1980). "Ever since
the advent of the Workers' Compensation Act, ingenious attorneys representing injured workers
have sought ways and means of obtaining greater benefits than the workers' compensation
award." Id. at vi.
118. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 793, 249 P.2d 8, 15 (1952). See also Baugh v. Rogers,
24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 P.2d 633 (1944). See generally, Comment, Dual Capacity After A.B. 684,
11 W. ST. U.L. REv. 59 (1983) (discussing the demise of the dual capacity doctrine).
119. Duprey, 39 Cal. 2d at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 785-89, 249 P.2d at 10-13.
122. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15.
123. See, e.g., Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 30 (1981). The plaintiff in Bell was allowed to sue his employer for products liability
when a fire broke out while he was delivering gas packaged and marketed by his employer.
Id. at 282-83, 637 P.2d at 275, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 39. See also Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo
Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 102, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) (employee injured on scaffolding
allowed to bring products liability action against employer who manufactured the scaffolding).
See generally, Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third-Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturer
in Products Liability Litigation,. 12 IND. L. REV. 553 (1979).
124. See In Re Consolidated Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. at 763-71 (the government
contractors in some cases of nuclear testing were both the manufacturer and the employer).
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capacity, however, was foreclosed legislatively in 1982,125 and is no
longer viable in most situations.'26
A second judicially created exception to exclusivity involves a
physical assault on the employee by the employer.'27 This exception
has been codified and is limited to a "willful physical assault."'128
Employees who have been exposed to harmful substances may en-
counter difficulty in characterizing the facts of the exposure as a willful
physical assault. 129
Of the remaining exceptions to the exclusivity rule, 3 ' only the
exception created in the seminal case of Johns-Manville Products Corp.
v. Superior Court'3' may provide a viable theory for employees in
the instant context. Johns-Manville involved exposure during employ-
ment to asbestos, a known health hazard.'32 An employee was allowed
to bring a tort action for the aggravation of work-related injuries
caused by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the fact that
the employee had asbestosis and that the disease was work-related.' 3
125. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(a). Section 3602(a) provides that workers' compensation is the
exclusive remedy notwithstanding the fact "that either the employee or the employer also occupied
another or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the employee's industrial injury." Id.
126. Id. §3602(b)(3). Section 3602(b)(3) allows an action at law for products liability in
the unusual situation when an employer manufactures a defective product which is sold to
a third party who then provides the product for the employee's use. Id. The likelihood of
these facts occurring is obviously slim. See Comment, supra note 118, at 65.
127. See, e.g., Magulio v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975);
contra, Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d 451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1968).
128. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(1).
129. But cf. Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 375, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 426
(1983) (a cause of action for battery arises when consent to physical contact is fraudulently
induced by the defendant). See infra notes 130-150 and accompanying text (discussion of employer
fraud).
130. The legislature has codified two additional exceptions to exclusivity, but neither is relevant
in the instant context. Labor Code section 3706 allows an action at law "if any employer
fails to secure the payment of compensation." CA. LAB. CODE §3706. Employers have no
incentive not to insure, since insurance premiums are always less risky than potential tort liability.
See Comment, supra note 118, at 64. A second statutory exception occurs in the unique situa-
tion in which the employer has removed or failed to install safety equipment on a power press.
CAL. LAB. CODE §4558.
131. 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858.
132. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
133. Id. at.478-79, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. The employer had knowledge
of the employee's affliction as a result of an employee health care program. The employer,
however, concealed this knowledge from the employee. Id. at 469, 612 P.2d at 950, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 860. See also Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063,
102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (tort action allowed for insurer's deceit in investigation of workers'
compensation claim); Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp., 173 Cal. App. 2d 386, 343 P.2d
787 "(1959) (tort action for employer's fraud and conspiracy regarding nature of employee's
injury). Both Unruh and Ramey were heavily relied upon in Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at
475-77, 612 P.2d at 954-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864-65.
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The Johns-Manville holding has been codified in the California Labor
Code.'34
The similarities between fraudulent concealment and post-discharge
failure to warn are several. As in the FTCA cases,'" the employee
is confined under Johns-Manville to workers' compensation remedies
for the original work-related injury. The employee may seek tort
damages only for the aggravation of the injury occasioned by the
employer's subsequent conduct, which exceeded the ordinary employ-
ment context.' 36 Another similarity is that the mere negligence of the
employer in treating or failing to provide treatment of an industrial
injury is not sufficient to escape the exclusivity provisions., 37 At this
point, however, the analogy to FTCA failure to warn claims diverges
from the fraudulent concealment exception.
In California, establishing fraud in tort'38 requires proof of inten-
tional misrepresentation, 39 reliance,' 40 and injury.' 4' These requirements
were satisfied by the facts in Johns-Manville,'42 as the employer's in-
tentional misrepresentations were intended to induce reliance, in fact
induced reliance, and caused injury. 4 3 Because claims based on
misrepresentation are not cognizable under the FTCA, l'4 the fraudulent
concealment exception is not viable in that context.' 45 Fraudulent con-
cealment remains available'46 to the private employee as the basis of
a tort action in a case involving exposure to harmful substances during
employment. In the employment context, the more lucrative tort
134. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(2). Other states are beginning to recognize a fraudulent con-
cealment exception to the exclusive remedy rule. See, e.g., Millison v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 501 A.2d 505, 516-17 (N.J. 1985).
135. See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
136. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(2). The section begins: "Where the employee's injury is
aggravated. . . ." Id.
137. See, e.g., Hamilton v. U.S., 564 F. Supp. 1147, 1151, aff'd per curiam, 719 F.2d
1. (1983).
138. Tort fraud is differentiated from contract fraud. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§1709-1710
(tort fraud, or "deceit") with id. §§1571-1574 (fraud as a contract defense). The definitions,
however, are virtually identical. Id., §§1571, 1709.
139. CAL. Civ. CODE §1709. Misrepresentation can occur through suppression of a fact
one has a duty to disclose. Id. §1710. See also Barbara A., 145 Cal. App. 3d at 375 n.6,
193 Cal. Rptr. at 427 n.6.
140. CAL. CIV. CODE §1709.
141. Id.
142. "For the purposes of reviewing the trial court's denial of defendant's motion, we must
accept as true the allegations of plaintiff's complaint." 27 Cal. 3d at 470, 612 P.2d at 951,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
143. Id. at 469-70, 612 P.2d at 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. 860-61.
144. 28 U.S.C. §2680(h).
145. See Hungerford v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 581, 584-85, rev'd on other grounds,
307 F.2d 99 (1962).
146. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(2).
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recovery' 7 does not depend on whether the employer's misconduct
occurred during or after the employment relationship.' 48
As the court in Johns-Manville noted, " 9 proving fraudulent con-
cealment will be very difficult for an employee. The difficulty inheres
primarily in the economic disincentive for an employer to risk a tort
action by concealing and thereby aggravating an injury that is clearly
covered by workers' compensation. When an employee cannot prove
fraudulent concealment, the failure to warn theory may be an attrac-
tive alternative.' 50
D. The Failure to Warn Theory
The failure to warn theory is as effective in circumventing the
exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation law as in circumventing
the Feres doctrine. Under California workers' compensation law, a
primary condition of recovery is that the injury occur during the
employment relationship.' 5' Unless the statutory conditions for com-
pensation concur, the exclusivity provision has no effect. 5 ' The failure
to warn theory, on the other hand, requires that the tortious conduct
of the employer occur entirely after termination of the employment
relationship.' 3
A post-discharge failure to warn claim is thus not an exception to
the exclusivity rule, but falls totally outside the bounds of California
workers' compensation law.1'5 To achieve this result, the plaintiff must
be able to prove that the failure to warn occurred subsequent to the
147. Punitive damages can ordinarily be awarded in cases of fraud. CAL. CIv. CODE §3294.
The Labor Code, however, limits the damages for fraudulent concealment to "those damages
proximately caused by the aggravation." CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(b)(2).
148. No bar similar to Feres exists in the context of workers' compensation. When a codified
exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies, the timing of the employer's violation is im-
material. In Johns-Manville, for example, the employer's fraud occurred while the employee
was still working, and allegedly induced the employee to continue working. Johns-Manville,
27 Cal. 3d at 469-70, 612 P.2d 950-51, 165 Cal. Rptr. 860-61.
149. "We cannot believe that many employers will aggravate the effects of an industrial
injury by not only deliberately concealing its existence but also its connection with the employ-
ment." Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
150. See Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1018. In the failure to warn context, the employer's con-
duct must occur after the termination of the employment, but need only be negligent. Id.
151. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§3600(a), (a)(l), (a)(2).
152. CAL. LAB. CODE §3602(a). In relevant part, section 3602 provides that "where the
conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compen-
sation is . . . the sole and exclusive remedy of the employee . . . against the employer." Id.
153. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The injury occurs at a time when neither
employer nor employee is subject to the provisions of the act. See CAL. LAB. CODE §3600(a)(1).
154. The consequence is that the Molsbergen result is legally correct, even though the court
did not consider the implications of workers' compensation. See supra notes 89-94 and accom-
panying text.
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termination of the employment relationship. ' Presumably, the
employee's recovery would be limited to the aggravation of the work-
related injuries caused by the failure to warn, rather than the original
injuries which would be governed by workers' compensation." 6 Legally
and logically, the failure to warn theory could produce tort recovery
in the proper case. Several considerations, however, counsel against
the imposition of liability based upon the post-discharge failure to
warn theory.
DEFICIENCIES OF FAILURE TO WARN THEORY
Due to the specific context in which the post-discharge failure to
warn theory was developed, the theory is at once a masterpiece of
legal logic and a nightmare in practical application. Use of the theory
in the workers' compensation arena would conflict with existing law
and would raise several policy objections. These practical and legal
problems call into question the viability of the failure to warn approach
in the context of tort actions for work-related exposure to harmful
substances.
A. Practical Problems
A major difficulty with the failure to warn theory concerns the
need to prove that the employer was unaware of the risks of exposure
to the harmful substance during the employment relationship." 7 Not
only is the plaintiff forced to prove a negative, but the defendant
employer is placed in an equally anomalous position. The best strategy
for the employer is to offer negligence as a defense by proving that
the hazards of the substance were known at the time of exposure. 58
Although this defense has already proven successful in FTCA claims, 5 9
a jury presumably will be unreceptive to the employer's offer of
negligence as a defense. 6 ' The defense is doubly perilous since overly
155. Molsbergen, 757 F.2d at 1019-20.
156. The fraudulent concealment exception limits the plaintiff's tort recovery to the ag-
gravation of the original work-related injury. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 478, 612 P.2d
at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. A similar result obtains under FTCA claims, since the original
exposure occurred during active duty and recovery is barred by Feres. Thornwell, 471 F. Supp.
at 352-53.
157. See supra 62-65 and accompanying text.
158. If the employer knew of the risk during employment, the failure to warn occurred
at that time and the tort would fall under the provisions of workers' compensation law. See
supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
159. See Consolidated Testing Litigation, 616 F. Supp. at 777-79.
160. See 28 U.S.C. §2402. No right to a jury trial exists in an FTCA action against the
United States. Id.
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strenuous proof of its validity may result in the employer running
afoul of the fraudulent concealment exception.' 6' To the extent that
the theory places unfair burdens of proof on both parties, California
courts may be unwilling to accept post-employment failure to warn.
Another difficulty arises in proving the basic elements of the tort. 61
Factual causation is an element of all torts.'63 Many employees will
no doubt be frustrated in attempts to prove that the initial exposure
caused injury.'64 For example, proof that exposure to radiation caused
injury in a particular case is complicated by three factors: (1) clinical
manifestation of the injury may take decades; (2) cancer induced by
radiation cannot be distinguished from cancer induced by other causes;
and (3) only circumstantial evidence of causation is available, based
upon expert opinion and statistical probability.' 61 Proof of aggrava-
tion of the injuries by the employer's post-employment failure to warn
may be even more elusive.' 6  Similarly, proof of damages 67 may
frustrate attempts to use failure to warn as a basis of tort liability.
Apportioning damages between the injuries caused by the exposure
and the aggravation by subsequent failure to warn will be speculative
at best. As a practical matter, the problems of proof severely limit
the utility of failure to warn theory as a means of circumventing the
exclusive remedy rule of workers' compensation.
In addition, the operation of existing California statutes effectively
curtails the number of cases in which the failure to warn theory would
be viable. The legislature has created an extensive regulatory system
for the control of hazardous substances in the workplace. 61 The
employer has a statutory duty both to maintain a safe workplace' 69
161. See supra notes 131-149 and accompanying text (discussion of fraudulent concealment).
162. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 72, §30 at 164-65.
163. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the five essential elements of an actionable
tort. Id. The plaintiff must show (1) the defendant had a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached
the duty; (3) the defendant's breach of the duty caused the plaintiff's injury; (4) the defen-
dant's, conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (5) the damages thus caused. Id.
164. The difficulty of proving causation has been a major factor in the denial of many
claims under the Veteran's Benefits Act. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
165. See Comment, Shifting the Burden, supra note 29 at 964. The comment advocates
shifting the burden of proving causation in FTCA cases to the defendant, based on a line
of California case law. Id. at 963-72. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948);
Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970); Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 912 (1980). Although the analysis is persuasive, no case has accepted the argument as
of 1986.
166. See, e.g., Sweet v. United States, 528 F. Supp. 1068, 1075-77 (D.S.D. 1981).
167. See PROSSER AND KETON, supra note 72, §30 at 164-65.
168. CAL. LAB. CODE §§6360-6399.7. Former section 6399.9, which provided for automatic
repeal of these sections as of January 1, 1986, was repealed on September 29, 1985, without
substitution of a new termination date. 1985 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. c. 1000, §5 (West).
169. CAL. LAB. CODE §6400.
1496
1986 / Post-Employment Failure to Warn
as well as to "do everything reasonably necessary to protect the life,
safety, and health of employees."' 70 The employer's duties include
a general duty to warn employees of the risks associated with the
employment,' 7 ' as well as a specific requirement that the employer
notify all employees who have been or are being exposed to toxic
or harmful substances.'7 Although an employee does not have a direct
legal remedy against the employer for violation of statutory duties,' 73
the statutes provide for various civil and criminal penalties.' 74 Com-
prehensive regulation of hazardous substances may indicate legislative
intent to preempt the field.
The statutory duties and incentives for compliance, in combina-
tion with the problems of proving claims,' 75 will certainly limit the
practical availability of a post-employment failure to warn claim.
The fact that the number of actions may be limited does not necessarily
argue against the use of the failure to warn theory in a proper case.' 76
The difficult position in which the theory places both defendant and
plaintiff 77 may counsel judicial caution in accepting post-employment
failure to warn. The most serious objections to the viability of the
theory are encountered in the area of law and policy.
B. Legal and Policy Problems
When imposing a new duty, California courts have considered the
extent of the burden that imposition of the duty would place on the
defendant.' 7 1 'Allowing a failure to warn action in the employment
context would impose a new duty on employers in that employers
would become responsible for a continuing duty to notify former
170. Id. §6401.
171. Arthur v. Merchant's Ice and Cold Storage Co. of Los Angeles, 173 Cal. 646, 105
P. 976 (1909). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§492, 510 (1957). Breach of the
common law duty to warn is compensable under workers' compensation law. Johns-Manville,
27 Cal. 3d at 474-75, 612 P.2d at 954, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
172. CAL. LAB. CODE §6408(e). See also id. §6398 (employer required to furnish employees
who are or may be exposed to a hazardous substance with a material safety data sheet (MSDS)
explaining the dangers of the particular substance).
173. See CAL. LAB. CODE §6307.
174. Id. §§6423-6435. However, evidence of employer violation of statute is admissible in
a workers' compensation or tort claim by an injured employee. Id. §6304.5.
175. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty of proving a failure
to warn claim).
176. The fraudulent concealment exception suffers from similar limitations due to specific
factual requirements. See supra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text (plaintiff must prove a negative and
defendant's best defense is negligence).
178. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (four factors considered in imposing
a duty to warn).
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employees of newly discovered risks. In order to carry out this duty,
employers would be required to keep vast employment records in
perpetuity. The records would necessarily have to include informa-
tion on the dates, location, and nature of every position held by each
employee. Unlike the military,'" private employers are under no
statutory duty to maintain records sufficiently accurate to perform
a duty to warn. In addition to the cost of maintaining the records,
the costs of notifying all employees potentially at risk also could be
significant. Taken in conjunction with the existence of a thorough
regulatory scheme concerning hazardous substances in the workplace,'80
the onerous burden on employers favors a policy against the imposi-
tion of a duty to warn former employees.
Aside from the burden on the employer that would result from
imposing a new duty to warn, recent years have witnessed a trend
on the part of both the judiciary"' and the legislature"8 ' to limit
exceptions to the exclusivity rule. Since workers' compensation benefits
are available for injuries from exposure to hazardous substances, the
incentive for the courts to adopt a post-discharge failure to warn theory
is diminished. Standing alone, the fact that workers' compensation
benefits are available, or have already been recovered, is not a bar
to an additional recovery in tort.8 3 In combination with the clear
legislative policy of limiting exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule,
however, the availability of a workers' compensation recovery counsels
against allowing tort recovery outside the workers' compensation
system.
Application of the post-employment failure to warn theory,
moreover, would create inequities in the remedies available to pre-
sent and former employees for similar injuries.'" The inequities result
179. The federal government is required to keep detailed records on all service personnel.
See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. 505.5 (Army recordkeeping procedures).
180. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text (discussion of statutory regulation of
hazardous substances in the workplace).
181. See U.S. Borax and Chemical Corp., 167 Cal. App. 3d at 411, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
158. "In these days of ever shrinking judical resources, the plaintiff's bar would be well advis-
ed to heed these [exclusivity] rules." Id.
182. See 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 922, §4 at 3365. These amendments to sections 3600, 3601 and
3602 of the Labor Code severely restricted exceptions to the exclusivity provisions. Id. See
supra notes 125-134 and accompanying text (discussion of statutory limits on judicial exceptions).
183. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 478-79, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866. The
general rule is that workers' compensation benefits recovered will be set off against the tort
recovery. Id.
184. The fraudulent concealment exception.to the exclusivity provision, in contrast, is equally
available to former and present employees. See supra notes 131-150 and accompanying text
(discussion of fraudulent concealment exception). Proper use of the exception depends only
on the intent, knowledge and conduct of the parties. Id.
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from the premium the failure to warn theory places on the timing
of the employer's breach of the duty to warn.' 5 Since the exclusivity
provision applies unless the employer's failure to warn occurs after
the employment relationship is terminated,'86 the time that the employer
learned of the risks of exposure to the hazardous substance becomes
crucial to the successful use of the post-employment failure to warn
theory.' 7 The emphasis on timing means that a former employee may
have greater remedies for the similar injuries than a present
employee.' 88
The same inequity exists when the employer's failure to warn was
intentional, so long as the timing of the employer's knowledge was
proper and the conduct did not amount to fraudulent concealment.'8 9
Without proof of specific intent to injure, the employee cannot recover
in tort even with proof that the original exposure was intentional.'9 °
The use of post-employment failure to warn theory thus produces
unfair and irrational inequities to the extent that a former employee
has a greater remedy than a present employee.
By affording those who have left employment more extensive
remedies than are available to those who remain, the failure to warn
claim does nothing to further the clearly expressed legislative policy
insuring a safe and healthful workplace.' 9' More importantly, allow-
ing use of the theory would frustrate major policies underlying the
185. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (discussion of failure to warn theory).
186. Id.
187. The exclusivity provision is inapplicable only if the employer's duty to warn does not
arise until after the employment had terminated. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
188. Understanding of this anomaly may be facilitated by consideration of a hypothetical
situation. Suppose two employees, A and B, worked together from 1970-1975 for the C Com-
pany and were exposed to a substance not known to be hazardous. In 1975, B left C's employ,
but A continued to work for C and continued to be exposed to the substance. In 1980, C
discontinued use of the substance upon learning of the risks. C did not warn either A or B
of these risks, but the conduct was only negligent. Since A was exposed to the substance for
a longer period of time, A's injuries are more severe. Under the failure to warn theory, B
can recover damages in tort from C since C's negligence as to B occurred after the termination
of employment. Although A's injuries are more severe, A is limited to workers' compensation
remedies since C's failure to warn A occurred during employment.
189. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863. "[Slection
4553 is the sole remedy for additional compensation against an employer whose employee is
injured in the first instance as the result of a deliberate failure to assure that the physical
environment of the work place is safe." Id.
190. Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal. App. 3d 810, 819, 181 Cal. Rptr. 342,
347 (1982). "If the employee is unable to prove specific intent to injure, he will be precluded
from receiving damages and will have to resort to workers' compensation as his only remedy."
Id. Accord, Wright v. FMC Corporation, 81 Cal. App. 3d 777, 146 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1978);
Buttner v. American Bell Telephone Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 581, 107 P.2d 439 (1940).
191. CAL. LAB. CODE §6300 (stating legislative intent that the OSHA provisions should en-
sure a safe and healthful workplace).
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workers' compensation system by exposing the employer to liability
in tort and allowing the employee to recover outside the system.' 92
Indeed, as the court in Johns-Manville stated with regard to employer
failure to warn,
Such conduct may be characterized as intentional or even deceitful.
Yet if an action at law were allowed as a remedy, many cases
cognizable under workers' compensation would also be prosecuted
outside that system. The focus of the inquiry in a case involving
work-related injury would often be not whether the injury arose but
the state of knowledge of the employer and the employee regarding
the dangerous condition which caused the injury. Such a result would
undermine the underlying premise upon which the workers' com-
pensation system is based. 93
CONCLUSION
Presently, many people are being exposed to toxic substances in
employment.' 9 The risks of these hazardous agents are not always
known, either to the employees or to their employers. Worse yet, the
effects of exposure may not become apparent until years after the
exposure. By then, irreversible injury may have afflicted both the vic-
tims and their offspring. 195
In federal law, a tort action for post-discharge failure to warn has
been developed in the situation involving former service personnel.
The emergence of this theory of recovery may induce former employees
of private companies to attempt to use the post-employment failure
to warn theory to circumvent the limitations of workers' compensa-
tion law. Although a workers' compensation remedy is available to
an employee who has been injured from exposure to hazardous
substances, the failure to warn theory avoids the strictures of workers'
compensation by focusing on a tort that occurs after termination of
the employment relationship. While the theory seems attractive in-
itially, the use of the failure to warn theory in the context of private
employment is fraught with problems.
The theory imposes difficult burdens of proof on both plaintiff
and defendant by requiring the former to prove a negative and the
192. Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d at 474, 612 P.2d at 953, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
193. Id.
194. Comment, supra note 7 at 349-50. In fact, the rate of exposure is increasing. Id.
195. Id. at 350.
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latter to use negligence as a defense. Moreover, while recovery under
workers' compensation is relatively swift and sure, the employee will
encounter serious difficulties in proving causation and damages under
the tort theory. Finally, existing statuory regulation of hazardous
substances may limit the incidence of cases in which the employer
fails to warn the employee of the risks of exposure. In application,
therefore, the post-employment failure to warn theory would pose
numerous practical problems and would probably not be available
to the great majority of employees injured by exposure to hazardous
substances.
More importantly, statutory regulation of hazardous substances and
the comprehensive workers' compensation mechanism indicate
legislative intent to preempt the field of workplace safety. Recent
legislation limiting judicially created exceptions to the exclusive remedy
rule bolster this argument. Indeed, a similar trend is emerging in the
judiciary. Furthermore, courts have been unwilling to create a new
duty when, as here, imposition of the duty would place an onerous
burden on the defendant.
Acceptance of the post-employment failure to warn theory would
also create inequities in remedies available to former as opposed to
present employees. Allowing former employees a greater recovery than
current employees does not further the legislative policy of enhancing
workplace safety. Most importantly, judicial creation of another
exception to the exclusive remedy provision would contravene the major
policies of providing swift and certain recovery to employees while
limiting employer liability at law. The legislature has reaffirmed a
commitment to these policies by limiting or eliminating most judicially
created exceptions to the exclusivity rule.
In sum, California courts would be unwise to allow claims for post-
employment failure to warn. Recognition of the tort would seriously under-
mine existing legislative policy, while failing to benefit a significant number
of employees exposed to hazardous substances. Since the employment
field is heavily regulated, modifications in statutory schemes should be
left to the legislative process, which is better able toreconcile the interests
of specific groups with the broader public good.
Mark R. Jensen
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